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Abstrat
Nowadays most of the malware appliations are ei-
ther paked or proteted. This tehniques are ap-
plied espeially to evade signature based detetors
and also to ompliate the job of reverse engineers
or seurity analysts. The time one must spend
on unpaking or derypting malware layers is of-
ten very long and in fat remains the most ompli-
ated task in the overall proess of malware anal-
ysis. In this report author proposes MmmBop as
a relatively new onept of using dynami binary
instrumentation tehniques for unpaking and by-
passing detetion by self-modifying and highly ag-
gressive paked binary ode. MmmBop is able to
deal with most of the known and unknown pak-
ing algorithms and it is also suitable to suessfully
bypass most of urrently used anti-reversing triks.
This framework does not depend on any other 3rd
party software and it is developed entirely in user
mode (ring3). MmmBop supports the IA-32 arhi-
teture and it is targeted for Mirosoft Windows
XP, some of the further deliberations will be refer-
ring diretly to this operating system.
1 Introdution
Most of the urrently popular malware is runtime
paked, enrypted or obfusated. However not
only malware is paked
1
, pakers are also suess-
fully used in other popular software appliations
mostly to defend against raking and illegal
opying. Therefore solutions limited only to
paker detetion annot typify whether a paked
appliation is really a malware or not, beause suh
assumption leads to large number of false-positives
alerts. In other words this means that in most
of ases deteting, analysing of paked binary
ode an be only performed after the payload is
unpaked. Appending to various external soures
[11, 6℄ about 79% of malware is paked, where the
most popular pakers are UPX (more then 50%
of malware les), PECompat, Upak, tElok,
Yoda's Crypter, FSG, PESpin, ASPak. Using
paking programs auses a transform of original
program into a paked program (the original ode
is ompressed, enrypted or both). Eah paked
program is equipped with so alled loader stub
(restoration routine) whih works before original
program. The restoration routine task is to unpak
(restore) original paked binary ode and throw
the exeution to original entry point. Eah paker
typially provide its own loader stub whih relies
on usage of spei algorithms and beause of that
it's hard to reate one ultimate unpaker whih
ould handle dierent loader stubs. Furthermore
some of the pakers like tElok, PESpin, Yoda's
Crypt are reating an armored loader stub, whih
takes an advantage of massive amounts of anti-
debugging, anti-reversing triks and self-modifying
ode tehniques. Suh protetion tehniques
often ause a major inonveniene in the malware
unpaking and analysis proess.
This paper will present the method for by-
passing paked, obfusated, armored layers and a
ouple of methods for nding original entry point
(OEP). Author will also try to present unpaking
mehanism used in MmmBop, its main goals,
limitations and also other related work.
1
Author uses the term paked and its variations to refer
to the tehniques of ompressing, enrypting (armoring) and
obfusating binary ode.
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2 Main Goals
Like most of the urrently known unpakers Mmm-
Bop was developed to fulll spei objetives,
whih are:
• nding original entry point (OEP) and stoping
the exeution at its plae (instrument only the
loader stub)
• bypassing the protetion layers equipped with
anti-reversing triks, obfusated and self-
modifying ode, keeping high level of trans-
pareny (avoiding interferenes)
As it was previously stated MmmBop is ompletely
userland appliation and it does not interfere with
the stability of operating system. It also does not
use debugging API, virtual mahine or emulation
whih signiantly derease the risk of being de-
teted. MmmBop uses dynami binary instrumen-
tation for traing the exeution ow, next setion
presents its general arhiteture.
3 Arhiteture
MmmBop onsist of two separate modules: Inje-
tor and DBI Engine. Eah of the modules will be
presented in the next subsetions.
3.1 Injetor module
The main tasks of the Injetor module are:
1. reating a suspended proess of the target ap-
pliation (appliation to be unpaked)
2. loading DBI Engine into the proess spae
3. informing DBI Engine about urrent program
entry point
4. throwing exeution to the DBI generated blok
It is important to notie that the entire inje-
tion proess is done virtually without physial le
modiation. It espeially prominent when the
loader stub of the paker is aggressive and omputes
heksums from the originally paked le. Inje-
tor module onsist of an own position independent
stub, whih performs the DBI Engine loading in
the target proess spae. When the Injetor work
is done it terminates itself and resumes the target
proess.
3.2 DBI Engine
This module is in fat the heart of MmmBop. It
is ompletely independent and does not rely on
any other known dynami binary instrumentation
frameworks like DynamoRIO [1℄ or Pin [2℄. Even
though those two mentioned DBI frameworks are
far more advaned when it omes to instrumenting
normal appliations (not paked), they were not
designed to work with self-modifying, aggressive
binary ode. Pin authors laim that it supports
self-modifying ode, unfortunately the tests show
that it is still unable to instrument many loader
stubs - like the one produed by tElok or PESpin.
Furthermore it also ontains some other logi
errors whih often make the instrumentation
impossible and beause of that it annot be used in
unpaking proess direted for aggressive loaders
(this will be disussed further in subsetion 4.3). It
appears that Saron [14℄ (an unpaking approah
using Pin) is also unable to work with aggressive
pakers like tElok. Pin's engine is not open soure
so it is hard to loate potential errors and address
a proper x. Keeping in mind the DBI limits
presented above author managed to reate own
instrumentation framework, whih was developed
speially to instrument the loader stub.
General DBI Engine arhiteture is presented below
(Figure 1):
Figure 1: General omposition of MmmBop Dy-
nami Binary Instrumentation engine.
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In urrent implementation MmmBop supports only
single threaded loader stubs (restoration routines)
whih is enough to handle most of the known pak-
ers.
3.2.1 Code ahe
Code ahe is responsible for enabling native ode
exeution instead of performing emulation. Suh
solution signiantly dereases the slowdown rate
(pure emulation is typially about few hundreds
times slower then native ode exeution). Unlike
the mehanisms used in DynamoRIO [5℄, Mmm-
Bop ode ahe stores only one blok at a time and
also it does not apply any other optimizations like
diret/indiret branhes linking
2
or building traes.
This is one of the main assumptions of MmmBop,
even if suh optimizations onsiderably inrease the
speed of instrumented appliations they are hard to
implement in self-modifying, aggressive ode, like
pakers restoration routines. That's why MmmBop
limits suh optimizations to minimum and performs
them only for indisputable situations (ie. when
the basi blok is not onsidered self-modifying).
Cahed ode ontains the same logi as the origi-
nal appliation ode, the only valuable hanges are
made to the ontrol transfer instrutions, whih are
modied to ensure that MmmBop will always re-
tain ontrol before the ode will exeute new basi
blok. Additionally some other instrumentation is
injeted to the ahed ode as well, this will be pre-
sented more deeply in next setions of this artile.
3.2.2 Basi Blok Builder
Basi Blok Builder like the name says is responsi-
ble for reating basi bloks. Basi bloks are a sets
of instrutions nalized with a single ontrol trans-
fer instrution (in other words basi blok ontains
set of instrutions whih have a single point of en-
try and a single point of exit for program ontrol
ow). General algorithm for reating a single basi
blok from original appliation ode is dened as
follows (Algorithm 1).
Important Note: When generating basi bloks
for aggressive binary ode speial are must be
2
With one exeption, the links are generated when spe-
ied basi blok is onsidered not self-modifying and the
branh target is loated in the same basi blok.
Algorithm 1: Basi blok generation
input : orgva
output: A ahed basi blok
begin
done←− false
currentva ←− orgva
while !done do
instr = disassemble(currentva)
swith instr.type do
ase Control Transfer Instrution
AddRetainControlInstrumentation()
done←− true
otherwise
StoreInstrution()
break
currentva += instr.len
end
taken beause sometimes the input memory ad-
dress orgva or any partiular instrution following it
maybe invalid. Therefore entire basi blok gener-
ation proess must be proteted by exeption han-
dler, whih will break the proess if the soure in-
strution is unavailable and additionally it will not
ause a fatal fault in the DBI engine.
3.2.3 Context swith
Context swith is essential for separating origi-
nal program CPU state from MmmBop internal
mehanisms. In other words all original registers,
ags, stak spae are ompletely separated from the
MmmBop. In this ase full stak transpareny is
ahieved. There is one interesting (bonus) detail:
when working with ompletely pure stak spae
(used for swithing with the original stak spae),
it is important to update the top of stak and
bottom of stak values in the Thread Information
Blok (TIB) beause otherwise the exeption han-
dlers (like the one used in basi blok builder) will
not get exeuted (and this should be onsidered as
fatal).
3.2.4 Dispather
As it was previously stated speial instrumentation
is used for ontrol transfer instrutions to make
sure MmmBop will retain ontrol before exeuting
new basi blok. In fat in suh situations the
3
ontrol retains to the Dispather element, whih
deides what to do next. Typially Dispather
exeutes Basi Blok Builder to reate new basi
blok pointed by the original destination of ontrol
transfer instrution. After this is done exeution is
transfered to the newly generated ahed ode (of
ourse after performing the ontext swith).
Besides the presented dispather, MmmBop uses
few more to follow the original exeution proess
orretly. Those dispathers will be presented in
next setions.
3.2.5 Exeption Dispather
Causing (generating) exeptions is a very popular
trik among PE le protetors. Typial senario
works as follows:
1. Setup Strutured Exeption Handler
2. Generate Exeption (exeution is thrown to
SEH frame)
3. In SEH frame: hek the EXCEPTION_RECORD
[8℄ and CONTEXT [7℄ strutures, basing on the
values deide what to do next.
When the exeption is generated the
EXCEPTION_RECORD and CONTEXT strutures
are lled respetively. Whenever the exeption will
happen in the ahed ode, the ExeptionAddress
and Context.Eip elds will be lled too, however
they will point to the ahed ode not to the orig-
inal address. Whenever loader stub makes use of
those two values it is almost ertain that the instru-
mentation proess will fail. To address this issue
MmmBop hooks the KiUserExeptionDispather
[9℄ funtion, whih is alled before the exeution of
the atual strutured exeption handler. This gives
MmmBop the opportunity to lter and x the
ExeptionAddress entry from EXCEPTION_RECORD
and Eip entry from CONTEXT struture. If the
exeption happened in ahed ode, MmmBop
will alulate the orresponding loation and
update both of mentioned entries with pointer to
original exeption address (sine both strutures
are loated in writeable memory this is a fairy
easy step). Unlike Saron no kernel module is
developed to lter generated exeptions, this
solution has it good and bad sides. Speial are
should be taken with hiding the hook more deeply
sine loader stub may look for it. However this
solution worked perfetly with all tested pakers.
3.2.6 Continue Dispather
Some pakers use NtContinue [13℄ funtion to
transfer the exeution to other loation (for ex-
ample Yoda's Crypter uses this method to return
the exeution to the original entry point (OEP)).
This funtion is also exeuted when exeption han-
dler returns EXCEPTION_CONTINUE status. Sine
this funtion will hange the thread ontext indi-
retly, MmmBop will loose the trak of the ex-
eution hain. To resolve this issue MmmBop
hooks NtContinue, saves old Context.Eip and up-
dates it with its own handler. After exeuting
NtContinue the ontrol is thrown to MmmBop
handler whih ontinues the instrumentation from
previously saved Context.Eip.
4 Unpaking Issues
In this setion author will try to desribe some of
the most important issues that were neessary to
solve to make MmmBop eetive. Sometimes to
illustrate spei issue more deeply additional real
world examples will be provided as well.
4.1 Instrumenting CALL
The CALL instrution saves proedure linking
information on the stak (return address) and
alls dened proedure. Besides the normal usage,
self-modifying ode uses this instrution to address
relatively to the return address plaed on the stak,
this is often referred as GetPC ode (the variant
of {CALL/POP reg/SUB reg,IMM32} instrutions
is sometimes named as delta handling). Following
ode (Listing 1) presents how PESpin uses CALL
instrution for relative addressing.
004040 D8 CALL 2.004040DD
004040 DD MOV EBX ,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP ℄
004040 E0 ADD EBX ,12
004040 E3 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[EBX ℄,6 B1E8
Listing 1: Fragment of PESpin ode, that illus-
trates using CALL return address as a operand for
relative addressing and self ode modiation.
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CALL instrution at 0x004040D8 transfers the
exeution to 0x004040DD and simultaneously
pushes the return address (0x004040DD) on the
stak. This address is then loaded into EBX
register (instrution at 0x004040DD) and inreased
with 0x12 (instrution at 0x004040E0). The EBX
register (now ontaining 0x004040EF value) is
used via the SUB instrution at 0x004040E3 to
deode (self-modify) instrution bytes loated at
0x004040EF. Therefore the return address must
point to original ode loation, not the orrespond-
ing loation in ode ahe, beause even though
the ahed ode does keeps the same program logi
it is extended with instrumentation instrutions
and it is limited to one basi blok. In other words
the same deoding proess in referene to ahed
ode may provide other (unstable) results, so
exeuting the instrution loated at 0x004040E3
may be fatal in this ase. MmmBop takes are of
this situation and points the return address to the
original loation.
While working with self-modifying ode it is good
to not assume that like in normal appliation af-
ter every CALL instrution, RET instrution will be
used to retain ontrol. In suh situations it is quite
possible that the exeution will never land to the
return address stored by CALL in fat this is a pretty
known trik for disabling the funtionality of STEP
OVER in debuggers.
4.2 Handling self-modifying ode
Sine MmmBop only proesses one basi blok
at a time, instrution whih modies memory
orresponding to dierent basi blok is simply
ignored. However the problems start when an
instrution modify memory in range of urrent
basi blok. This means that the basi blok
loated in ode ahe does not orrespond to the
original one any longer (sine it was modied) -
and the general logi is probably hanged. Most
of aggressive protetors make use of this tehnique
like PESpin (see Listing 2 - extended previous
listing).
004040 D7 PUSHAD
004040 D8 CALL 2.004040DD
004040 DD MOV EBX ,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP℄
004040 E0 ADD EBX ,12
004040 E3 SUB DWORD PTR DS:[ EBX ℄,6 B1E8
004040 E9 DEC BYTE PTR DS:[EBX -3℄
004040 EC SUB BYTE PTR SS:[ESP ℄,17
004040 F0 OUT 46,AL
004040 F2 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EBX ℄,CL
004040 F4 IN AL ,74
004040 F6 SAHF
004040 F7 JNZ SHORT 2.004040FA
Listing 2: STAGE1: Fragment of PESpin ode, il-
lustrating ode before self-modiation.
As it was previously explained instrution at
0x004040E3 will ause a memory modiation
pointed by EBX register 0x004040EF. Next instru-
tion loated at 0x004040E9 will also ause a mem-
ory modiation to the area 0x004040EC. This will
ause the modiation of the basi blok logi, now
it presents following instrutions (Listing 3)
.
004040 EC SUB DWORD PTR SS:[ ESP ℄,2 .0040342F
004040 F3 OR ESP ,ESP
004040 F5 JE SHORT 2.00404095
004040 F7 JNZ SHORT 2.004040FA
Listing 3: STAGE2: Fragment of PESpin ode, il-
lustrating ode after self-modiation.
Instrution loated at 0x004040EC is ompletely
dierent then the one before performing deoding
proess. In addition to subsetion 4.1, if the return
address plaed by CALL instrution would be not
faked properly, PESpin stub would use the wrong
value for further unpaking proess (this would
result in fault).
To resolve suh situations additional instrumenta-
tion was used. Typially there are two ways of
faing suh problems both rely on instrumenting
instrution whih refers to memory in write mode:
1. monitor memory writes and hek if the desti-
nation memory is loated in the range of orig-
inal basi blok
2. monitor memory writes and hek if the origi-
nal basi blok heksum has hanged
Both of the listed mehanisms are implemented in
MmmBop and both are omparable in the terms of
speed. First mehanism requires some additional
ode instrumentation sine generally the requested
memory address an not be statially alulated.
After the exeution of 'memory write instrution'
5
MmmBop dispather heks if it aeted urrent
basi blok. When MmmBop detets suh ation, it
breaks the urrent basi blok and reates new one
(starting after the last exeuted instrution). Se-
ond solution does not require additional instrumen-
tation ode for alulating the destination memory
address. So after every reation of basi blok, a
heksum is generated from original ode (here the
partial Adler-32
3
[20℄ is used as a heksum algo-
rithm). Every time memory write ours in the
basi blok, the heksum is alulated one more
time from the original basi blok ode and then it
is ompared with the previously alulated one. If
there is a dierene the urrently ahed basi blok
is destroyed and next one is generated from the be-
ginning of last instrution that aused the memory
write. Current MmmBop implementation enables
using one of the two presented methods. The speed
omparison between those two mehanisms will be
presented in Testimonials setion (setion 6).
On the side note it's obvious that Prefeth Input
Queue (PIQ) [19℄ triks like the one used in PE-
Spin (REP STOSB instrution used to overwrite it-
self) have no inuene on MmmBop.
4.3 Prexes
Speial are should be taken while instrumenting
ontrol transfer instrutions whih are enoded to-
gether with IA-32 prexes. Some of the prexes
enoded together with ontrol transfer instrution
are used deliberately to ause exeptions (like for
example LOCK (0xF0) or OPERAND-SIZE (0x66)
prex). On the side note Pin tends to ignore suh
prexes, suh assumption makes it vulnerable to
suh attaks.
4.4 Hardware breakpoints
The IA-32 arhiteture provides speial sets of reg-
isters alled debug registers, used by the proessor
for debugging purposes. Those registers allow
setting various debug onditions assoiated with
four debug addresses written in DR0-DR3 registers
where the breakpoint ondition is stored in the DR7
register. Unlike software breakpoints, hardware
3
Author is aware of Adler-32 heksum algorithm weak-
nesses (ie. forging), however they don't represent a impor-
tant issue in this ase.
breakpoint (often alled as debug breakpoints)
do not require hanging the original ode. The
tElok protetor makes a pretty nasty usage of
this feature, following ode illustrates how tElok
restoration routine setups hardware breakpoints
(Listing 4).
00404120 MOV EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4℄
00404126 LEA EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX +24℄
00404129 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ ECX +4℄, EAX
0040412 C MOV EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4℄
00404132 LEA EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX +1F℄
00404135 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ ECX +8℄, EAX
00404138 MOV EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4℄
0040413 E LEA EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX +1A℄
00404141 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ ECX+C℄,EAX
00404144 MOV EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+B4℄
0040414 A LEA EAX ,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX +11℄
0040414 D MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ ECX +10℄, EAX
00404150 XOR EAX ,EAX
00404152 AND DWORD PTR DS:[ ECX +14℄, FFFF0FF0
00404159 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ ECX +18℄ ,155
Listing 4: Fragment of tElok restoration routine,
whih setups debug breakpoints.
Instrutions at 0x00404129, 0x00404135,
0x00404141, 0x0040414D write the breakpoint
loation to the DR0-DR3 debug registers respe-
tively. Instrution at 0x00404152 updates the DR6
registers and nally instrution at 0x00404159
enables four hardware breakpoints by setting
the DR7 register bits. Sine diret hanges to
debug registers require ring0 privileges, following
ode exeutes in the exeption handler and it
operates on the CONTEXT struture (ECX). The
modied ontext is then passed to NtContinue
funtion whih applies it to the seleted thread,
after resuming the exeution seleted hardware
breakpoints are set. After the CPU will exeute
instrution orresponding the breakpoint address
EXCEPTION_SINGLE_STEP will be thrown. This
exeption is ltered by tElok exeption handler
and following ode is exeuted (see Listing 5).
00404113 CALL 2.00404119
00404118 DB 00
00404119 POP EAX
0040411 A INC BYTE PTR DS:[EAX ℄
0040411 C SUB EAX ,EAX
0040411 E JMP SHORT 2.00404160
Listing 5: Fragment of tElok restoration routine,
whih handles single step exeptions.
Whenever tElok handles single step exeption, it
inreases the byte variable loated at 0x00404118
(whih is in fat a ounter) and it resumes the ex-
eution afterwards. This ounter value is used in
6
the further parts of the unpaking proess. There-
fore whenever hardware breakpoints will not be hit
the le will not be unpaked orretly. In this
ase when the ahed ode is exeuted instead of
the original one it's obvious that the breakpoints
will not be deteted and the unpaking proess will
fail. To orretly handle suh situations Mmm-
Bop monitors the ontext passed to NtContinue
funtion and writes down all the enabled hard-
ware breakpoints loations. Whenever the basi
blok builder meets the speied breakpoint loa-
tion MmmBop simply links urrent instrution to
the original breakpoint address. Beause of this
mehanism breakpoints are orretly handled and
MmmBop retains the program ontrol immediately
after the exeption is thrown.
5 OEP Finding
MmmBop may use dierent approahes direted for
nding original entry point of the paked program.
Sine it is able to instrument all the instrutions
whih ause memory writes, tehniques that rely
on this approah (deteting the exeution of previ-
ously written area) may be applied as well. Cur-
rently MmmBop fous on ontrol transfer heks,
so whenever the ontrol is returned to a basi blok
loated at speied memory range, MmmBop as-
sumes the original entry points was reahed. The
memory range used in this proess generally orre-
sponds to the borders of rst setion of the paked
le. Sine most of the pakers do not erase suh in-
formation this solution plays out quite well. From
the other hand pakers like uPak merge all of the
original setions into one
4
, this requires some man-
ual guessing of the down border of the original ex-
eutable setion. In the more hard situations it
seems to be possible to deliver another assumption,
like every unpaked program tends to use API fun-
tions delivered by the operating system or by addi-
tional libraries. Therefore the rst
5
ontrol transfer
to outside library may be used for further manual
analysis (sine typially the API all is loated just
after original entry point), however this should be
treated as an alternative tehnique beause it is not
4
On the side note similar mehanism is used in the Jol-
lyRoger virus.
always reliable. Additionally some other tehniques
may be applied to solve the extra ases (ie. the
dual-mappings [17℄ problem), for example like in-
terepting the mapping le API
6
(MapViewOfFile
and related funtions) or using the tehnique simi-
lar to the one from PolyUnpak [16℄.
6 Testimonials
Following setion will present sample results ob-
tained in the proess of unpaking (original entry
point nding) ustom exeutable by MmmBop.
In the tests a sample, 8 192 byte appliation was
used. The pakers tested were: UPX ver. 3.03w,
WinUpakRY ver. 0.39 nal, Yoda's Crypter
ver. 1.3 (options: CRC hek, anti dumping,
lear import information, API rediret), tElok
ver. 0.98 (options: debugger detetion, IAT-
rediretion), PESpin ver. 1.32 (options: debugger
detetion, API rediretion, antidump protetion,
ode rediretion). For eah paking tools le
was unpaked 10 times (5 times within the usage
Adler heksum algorithm, 5 times within the
usage of normal instrumentation) and the average
value was alulated. The results are written in
Table 1 and also illustrated on the hart below
(Figure 2). The number of basi blok transfers
required by speied paker is presented in Table 2.
Paker Name UtACRC [s℄ UtInstr [s℄
PESpin 4.6084 4.5795
tElok 1.2804 1.3159
yC 0.7611 0.9472
UPX 0.0759 0.0789
WinUpakRY 0.5930 0.5964
Table 1: Time required by MmmBop to unpak
a single le in referene to dierent pakers and
methods.
Where:
• UtACRC is the time required to unpak a le
while using Adler-32 heksum approah
5
Author assumes that the API alls done by the loader
stub are ignored.
6
Of ourse this may require developing a kernel module
beause native API [12, 4℄ may be used instead.
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• UtInstr is the time required to unpak a le
while using normal instrumentation (without
the Adler-32 heksum)
Figure 2: Chart illustrating time required by
MmmBop to unpak a single le in referene to
dierent pakers and methods.
Paker Name Basi Blok Transfers [#℄
PESpin 2364189
tElok 311614
yC 180234
UPX 15909
WinUpakRY 131424
Table 2: Number of basi blok transfers in refer-
ene to speied paker.
The results show that both methods used for de-
teting basi blok modiation (Adler-32 hek-
sum or the instrumentation approah) produed
omparable results. PESpin required the highest
amount of time beause it uses a lot of ontrol
transfers between the basi bloks. It should be ob-
vious that time required for the unpaking proess
will inrease proportionally to the size of paked
ode (sine more iterations will be required to om-
plete the restoration routine). Generally as for
the initial MmmBop implementation the results are
enough satisfying.
Figure 3: Chart illustrating number of basi blok
transfers in referene to speied paker.
7 Limitations
Most of the dynami binary instrumentation solu-
tions need to modify target proess address spae.
Unfortunately this is unavoidable. Some more so-
phistiated pakers may use this fat for detetion
purposes. However this may be not so easy to im-
plement, beause other software produts (like an-
tivirus solutions, rewalls) typially interfere with
the target proess address spae as well (by injet-
ing additional libraries and so on). Pakers, espe-
ially ommerial solutions must work on suh ma-
hines too, so it is very unlikely suh risky solution
will be implemented for MmmBop detetion. From
the other hand pakers based on Virtual Mahines
(VM) approah will not be aeted by MmmBop
solution. However, in suh ases MmmBop may
be used for reording the exeution trae, whih is
often very helpful in the further unpaking proess.
8 Related Work
There are a number of unpakers available nowa-
days, this setion will try to desribe most of the
related ones:
• OllyBonE [18℄ is a plugin for OllyDbg [21℄
whih relies on similar mehanism like PaX
or Shadow Walker does. It hanges the page
memory protetion of seleted region (typially
rst setion) and waits until exeption happens
8
at that range. If the exeption address (ex-
eption EIP) points somewhere inside the pro-
teted region then original entry point is found.
On the side note similar approah for unpak-
ing purposes was reated before by author of
this artile. The engine was alled dEPACKiT
and was developed and announed earlier [3℄
- unfortunately it was not released to publi.
Unlike OllyBonE it was a ompletely ring3 ap-
pliation.
• Renovo [10℄ uses an emulated environment
to monitor program exeution and memory
writes. As the emulated environment TEMU is
used. Renovo tries to nd original entry point
by deteting ode exeution from previously
written memory.
• Paradyn Projet [15℄ is a very similar approah
to MmmBop. Paradyn uses dynami binary
instrumentation for analyzing paked binary
ode (it uses Dyninst for this purpose). How-
ever it appears to be direted for Unix oper-
ating systems and urrently it annot handle
self-modifying ode.
• Saron [14℄ also uses dynami binary instru-
mentation tehnique (it uses Pin framework
as the dynami binary instrumentation frame-
work) to monitor program exeution together
with monitoring memory writes. Additionally
it uses hardware paging features in a similar
way like OllyBonE and related mehanisms do.
Beause Saron relies on Pin framework it is
unable to handle suh aggressive pakers like
tElok, PESpin et.
9 Future Work
MmmBop is an initial onept of generi unpaker,
together with the evolution of the evading and
anti-debugging tehniques MmmBop must be on-
stantly extended as well. Future MmmBop version
should onsider handling multi-threading loader
stubs and over more of the aggressive pakers. It
is quite possible that MmmBop an be quite more
optimized the initial version was build without any
additional optimizations.
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